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ABSTRACT 
 
Explanations for bureaucrats’ decisions to take bribes have evolved from accounts of incentives to 
focusing on expectations of others’ behavior. However, there are plausibly more considerations 
when making such choices in contexts of widespread violence, where refusal to take bribes may be 
associated with high costs. Yet, current insight into this topic is limited. This article investigates 
how violence upholds bribery through interviews with South African officials that enforce resource 
regulations in communities where gangs run poaching operations. The findings suggest that while 
citizens commonly give bribes to enable rule violations, this is a process of both temptations and 
threats: officials that do not take bribes face violent intimidations by citizens and corrupt col-
leagues. Through reducing direct costs in such settings, bribe taking is partly a strategy of social 
protection. This suggests that, besides incentives and expectations, administrative reforms may 
benefit from ‘fixing the security’ of bureaucrats in violent contexts. 
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Introduction 
In a large number of the world’s countries, bureaucratic corruption – interchangeably termed ad-
ministrative, petty, or small-scale corruption – remains relatively widespread in government authori-
ties.1 Such behavior is, for instance, when citizens have to bribe officials for services they are enti-
tled to or pay enforcement officers to make law violations go unnoticed. Yet, there is nothing petty 
or small about this problem. The presence of corruption in a country’s civil service is widely credit-
ed by scholars as well as policymakers to result in a number of bad outcomes, social as well as eco-
nomic (see Treisman 2007). However, there is no such consensus over what drives bureaucratic 
corruption and especially the choice of bureaucrats to engage in bribery. Keeping in mind the point 
that the treatment of corruption is closely related to its diagnosis (Mungiu-pippidi 2006), this is an 
important issue for social scientists that seek to advance reforms of public administrations.  
Influential rationalist explanations for bureaucrats’ decisions to take bribes (or not) focus on incen-
tives, stressing factors of gains from bribes in relation to the probability of getting caught and the 
potency of sanctions (Becker and Stigler 1974). The reasoning prompted corruption scholars to 
propose that bribe taking may be reduced by reforms such as raising civil servants’ salaries or in-
creasing monitoring and punishment for bribe taking (Ades and Di Tella 1999). This approach may 
be contrasted to a conceptualization of corruption in which scholars depict bureaucrats’ choice of 
engaging in bribery as a social dilemma (Rothstein 2005, 2011). Describing corruption as a collec-
tive action problem and using the analogy from game theory, this reasoning posits that an individu-
al bureaucrat will have little to gain from being ‘the sucker’ who does not take bribes. This thinking 
put expectations in focus as bribe taking is the logical strategy when most others in the bureaucracy 
are believed to be corrupt (Persson et al. 2013). However, the departure of this article is to propose 
that these two types of depictions may be in need of complements. Rather than seeking to present a 
third line of explanation, this article argues that previous perspectives have not focused on the costs 
of honesty – the consequences facing non-corrupt bureaucrats in administrations where bribery is 
common – and especially so in contexts of widespread violence. 
Numerous nation states do not hold the monopoly over violence. In such areas, officials’ task of 
enforcing laws on citizens may be characterized by tension or conflict. One example is policemen 
on the Afghan countryside having to adapt to independent militias that do not conform to laws and 
may have more power than the government. Another illustration is the customs officers in a Mexi-
can border town that may have good reasons not to inspect the trucks that are driven by members 
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of the fiercest cartels. Such officials will often be bribed so that law violations proceed as usual. But 
what are then the reasons for an official in such a context to take a bribe? It seems obvious that 
incentives matter: a miniscule salary and low risks of getting caught must be important. And surely, 
expectations should matter: when most other colleagues take bribes, it must feel pointless to be 
honest. However, these explanations do not involve the role of security for such officials. In these 
contexts criminal actors may enforce their will by violent threat. And it is plausible that, if it is dan-
gerous to deny violent actors the usual possibilities of paying their way around the law, this will 
affect the choice of taking bribes. To be precise, this reasoning refers to the form of petty corrup-
tion where officials are paid to turn a blind eye to law violations, often termed collusive corruption 
(Smith et al. 2003). The presence of violence should likely not have this effect on non-collusive cor-
ruption, when officials ask citizens for payments for services they are legally entitled to. Yet, while 
intuitive, research has rarely explored this reasoning in detail.  
The aim of this research endeavor is to gain further insights into how violence and intimidations 
may affect the choice to take bribes and, therefore, uphold administrative corruption. The article 
asks: In what way does violence and intimidations affect bureaucrats’ choice to take bribes? By exploring this 
question in a thorough analysis of original empirical material, the article seeks to reach both theo-
retical and empirical insights. It reports the results from interviews with officials in the South Afri-
can Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). These officials enforce regulations 
on resources in rural areas where they threaten the income of gangs that run lucrative poaching 
operations. Focusing on bureaucrats that implement policy in a context where violence and bribery 
occur extensively, this case study has rich potential to offer suggestive insights of this relationship. 
This is one of the first studies to examine the costs of refraining from and engaging in corruption 
against a violent backdrop. Through this investigation, the article contributes theoretically in two 
ways: first, it shows that bribery is not driven only by aspects of incentives or expectations but that 
there are also direct costs for a bureaucrat of remaining honest in a context where non-state actors 
use violence to make way for their legal violations. Second, the findings suggest that in such con-
texts, corruption may be seen as an institution underpinned by an enforcement apparatus of vio-
lence. These findings have implications for policy and suggest that besides fixing incentives and 
expectations, anti-corruption reforms may benefit from considering ‘fixing the security’ of bureau-
crats working in violent contexts. 
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Explaining a bureaucrat’s choice to engage in corruption  
Incentives matter 
The seminal work by Becker and Stigler (1974) outlines a model of bureaucratic corruption where 
the choice of enforcement officers to engage in bribery, or refraining from doing so, is understood 
through a cost-benefit analysis; The financial gain to enforcers from bribery is weighed against the 
probability of the state detecting malfeasance and, given that exposure could mean loss of employ-
ment, the minimum salary that would discourage enforcers from bribe taking (p. 7). Scholars fol-
lowing this tradition of analyzing the ‘market of enforcement’ have often focused on modeling the 
likelihood of detection, penalty rates and the relative size of salaries (e.g. Besley and McLaren 1993; 
Ades and Di Tella 1999). 
This reasoning is similar to frameworks that describe bribery as a problem that is conceptually un-
derstood through principal-agent theory. Amongst its various applications, these frameworks are 
often used to analyze the challenge of delegation in a bureaucracy. A typical principal-agent rela-
tionship is the dyadic one between an employer and an employee in a public administration.2 The 
goals of principals and agents may conflict and, because of asymmetries of information, principals 
cannot be sure that agents are carrying out their will (Milgrom and Roberts 1992; Shapiro 2005). 
Therefore, the principal (such as a senior manager) will face the decision problem that agents (for 
instance junior clerks) will pursue the principal’s objective. These agents have their own interests 
and will only act according to the employment contract if such behavior is advantageous. In dele-
gating power to agents, the principal will risk that subordinates will act in their self-interest and, 
with regard to corruption, engage in bribery to benefit themselves or their kin – behavior described 
as ‘agency costs’ (Klitgaard 1988; Groenendijk 1997). The challenge for principals is therefore to 
align the interest of agents with their own, to create incentive structures and to monitor the behav-
ior of agents (Shapiro 2005, p. 271). Accordingly, ‘the essence of the principal’s problem is the 
design of just such an incentive structure’ (Moe 1984, p. 756). This conceptualization of corruption 
has been tremendously influential, and following this line of thinking it has been proposed that 
bribery may be reduced through ‘providing the right incentives to bureaucrats’ (Ades and Di Tella 
1997, p. 504). These explanations, stemming from rational choice theory, assume that civil servants 
seek to maximize their expected income and that higher pay, increased monitoring and stronger 
punishments may therefore be successful policies to reduce administrative corruption (Rose-
Ackerman 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder 2001). Following this reasoning it is said that ‘suffi-
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ciently high rewards would eliminate all incentives to accept bribes’ (Polinsky and Shavell 2000, p. 
4).3  
Expectations matter 
Contrasting the incentive-focused view, there is a vein of research pointing to the important role of 
expectations of other bureaucratic actors in upholding bribery (cf. Myrdal 1968). Rothstein (2005) 
pictured this situation as a ‘trap’ where actors are caught in a predicament that resembles a social 
dilemma: what is good for the collective stands in contrast to what is individually rational. This 
reasoning departs from institutionalist accounts where ‘corruption represents an example of what 
are called frequently-dependent equilibria, and our expected gain from corruption depends crucially 
on the number of other people we expect to be corrupt’ (Bardhan 1997, p. 1331). A ‘player’ in 
these game-like situations knows that most of her colleagues will engage in corruption. In such 
contexts, ‘“street-level” tax bureaucrats or policemen have no incentive to refrain from corrupt 
practices because even if they as individuals start behaving honestly, nothing will change’ (Rothstein 
2011, p. 99). Their behavior therefore depends on how ‘existing institutions inform the agents’ 
mutual expectations – for example, the expectation about whether the other agents will take part in 
corrupt exchanges’ (ibid, p. 103).  
This reasoning criticize how principal-agent theory depicts corruption, especially the postulation of 
the principal’s intentions: ‘A drawback of the principal-agent approach is that to some extent it 
assumes away the problem, especially in [a developing country] context, because the political will to 
engage in vigorous monitoring and implement appropriate strategies is lacking, or worse yet the 
principal is himself corrupt’ (Rauch and Evans 2000, p. 529). Similarly, authors have pointed out 
that the assumption of an ‘honest principal’ – such as a senior manager – may be problematic when 
corruption is widespread. From this follows potentially that ‘the principal-agent framework be-
comes useless as an analytical tool since there will simply be no actors willing to monitor and pun-
ish corrupt behavior’ (Persson et al. 2013, p. 542). Put differently, Shapiro (2005) observes an in-
herent problem of this theory’s recommendations: ‘in an escalating cycle of agents overseeing 
agents, we must ask: Who monitors the monitors?’ (p. 280). Persson and colleagues (2013) argue 
that instead of a framework of principals and agents, corruption should be seen as a collective ac-
tion problem and they highlight why this conceptualization renders individuals with few reasons to 
act honestly: ‘Being the sole “sucker” in a corrupt game is the even worse outcome to everyone, 
                                                     
3
 This thinking has come in modified forms. Rauch and Evans (2000) introduce how meritocratic recruitment, may alter 
incentives and develop norms of an ‘esprit de corps’ where bribe taking is no longer the rule. In proposing that this may 
‘align interests’, their argument differs from the incentive model. Yet, their approach agrees with the model in predicting 
that competitive salaries will reduce incentives to take bribes (p. 49). 
  7 
which tends to lock the game into the suboptimal “corrupt” equilibrium as long as everyone ex-
pects everyone else to be corrupt’ (p. 457). The implications for reforms following from these two 
depictions are contrasting. While the principal-agent frameworks emphasize incentives, the collec-
tive action approach differs; it does not hold too much confidence in increased surveillance of bu-
reaucrats as – in the absence of non-corrupt managers and overseers – monitoring schemes risk 
being captured. Moreover, programs to increase salaries will supposedly not alter the main problem 
at hand. According to this reasoning, ‘the important thing will be to change actors’ beliefs about 
what “all” other actors are likely to do so that most actors expect most other actors to play fairly’ 
(Persson et al. 2013, p. 464). Thus, this perspective argues that it is essential to ‘fix the expecta-
tions’.4    
The cost of honesty matters  
It has been pointed out that general explanations of bureaucrats’ reasons for bribe taking may fall 
short for individual irregularities. Becker and Stigler (1974) acknowledge that some bureaucrats will 
tend to remain honest when stating that ‘for a given bribe, some men will condone offenses that 
other men would prosecute’ (p. 3). This point is confirmed by Ades and Di Tella (1999): ‘a desira-
ble feature of a model of corruption is that it allows for the existence of both honest and dishonest 
agents’ (p. 984). However, previous explanations have not extensively reviewed the costs of remain-
ing honest. The departure of this article from previous research is the argument that it is conceiva-
ble that there is more to bureaucrats’ choices to engage in bribery than financial losses or becoming 
‘a sucker’, especially when considering contexts with widespread violence.  
The literature tends to identify three elements of what defines ‘a state’: (i) the existence of an ad-
ministrative staff able (ii) to sustain the claim to the legitimate monopoly of control of violence and 
(iii) to uphold that monopoly within a given area (Giddens 1985). Similarly, a key feature of states is 
to ‘offer [its citizens] protection from local and external violence’ (Tilly 1985, p. 171). Yet, states 
existing today have different abilities of supplying protection as well as implementing rules and 
inducing rule compliance among citizens (Levi 1989). Having several synonymous or overlapping 
terminologies at hand, the notion of state capacity is useful to understand this feature.5 In Bäck and 
Hadenius’s (2008) account the concept has two components, administrative capacity and state-ness, 
and they make the point the latter factor is actually under negotiation in several countries: “[these 
states] exist in a juridical sense but that do not actually control their territory … [as] rebel forces 
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and warlords exercise military and other forms of control over large parts of the national territory” 
(p. 1). Examples of more moderate weakness in state capacity are settings with a presence of a 
criminal syndicate, drug cartels or other actors that challenge the violence monopoly. While authors 
have discussed such organizations, focusing especially on the Italian Mafia, in terms of a ‘state with-
in the state’ (Grossman 1995, p. 148), others see this is as far fetched and rather argue that these 
actors function along side the state and are ‘best understood as a set of firms specializing in the 
supply of protection’ (Gambetta 1996, p. 53). A further type of moderately challenged state capacity 
may be localities where the citizens use violent resistance to defy policies. For state actors, imple-
menting policies in these settings is a process that is often characterized by friction, tensions that 
have an impact on how these actors may perform tasks. For an illustration, Fjeldstad’s (2001) vivid 
description of tax collection in Tanzania in the late 1990s may serve as a case in point. In this con-
text, taxpayers in the countryside sometimes physically assaulted public tax collectors that visited 
distant districts, thus causing the collectors to be lax in certain geographical areas.  
In the light of such violence, previous description of bureaucrats’ choice to take bribes may need to 
be reevaluated. Consider again a situation where an official enforces laws in an area where violent 
actors operate and may be used to paying enforcement agents bribes to ignore their (illegal) actions. 
It is quite plausible to imagine that an official working in such an environment is faced with diffi-
cult choices and pressured from actors that wish to violate the law. Can present theory explain this 
agent’s choice to take a bribe or not? The accounts focusing on incentives do not seem to include 
the impact from violence in their standard analysis. In the perspective where expectations are in 
focus, the worst outcome for a bureaucrat is the risk of being the solitary employee without an 
extra income. Yet, if violence is a part of the game there is possibly more to such defection than 
just being a sucker. Refusing bribery may give more negative effects than financial losses: it could 
mean that bureaucrats that do not take bribes will face repercussions. Importantly, violence is likely 
different to other aspects in the calculus of taking bribes or not, because of 1) the direct impact of 
this consequence and 2) the magnitude of this cost. Therefore, in a context where violent actors op-
erate on a large scale, it therefore seems that something is missing in previous descriptions of brib-
ery. The article therefore expects that the security for officials must be of importance for under-
standing their choices. Yet, while intuitive, this reasoning is foremost hypothetical. Few current 
studies investigate how the choice to take bribes, or not, is affected by the presence of violent ac-
tors and intimidations from such.6  
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Having identified this intuitive gap of knowledge, the article explores this issue empirically. The 
purpose is hence to gain insight into how violence and intimidations affect the choice to take bribes 
and, therefore, uphold administrative corruption. By investigating original material the article seeks 
to reach both theoretical and empirical insights in this regard. The article reports the results from 
interviews with South African officials enforcing resources regulations. In this setting, the enforce-
ment of a legislation that seeks to counter illegal fishing threatens the interests of gangs that thrive 
from poaching. Moreover, the authority responsible for enforcement is known to have corruption 
problems. By exploring these accounts the article investigates in detail the process in which vio-
lence and intimidations may affect a bureaucrat’s choice to engage in corruption, or refrain from 
doing so. The investigation therefore offers promising opportunities to flesh out our understanding 
of this relationship.  
Case and methods 
A context of corruption and violence 
This study focuses on the implementation of the South African Marine Living Resources Act 
(MLRA) by officials in the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF). This legisla-
tion specifies the legal means to conduct fishing, for instance by outlining who has the right to fish, 
where one can do it and by which methods. It also specifies which actions are illegal, such as fishing 
without a license, in protected areas or targeting restricted species (Republic of South Africa 1998). 
The authority that enforces these rules with land-based patrols is the Compliance Directorate of 
DAFF. Its officers, who work at substations in harbors of rural towns along the coast, will inspect 
sites where fishers offload catches to monitor their compliance. Noncompliant fishermen will – in 
theory – face sanctions, such as receiving a fine or losing their fishing license. 
The relationship between state agents and citizens in South Africa in general, and in the fisheries 
sector in particular, has a history of strain and struggle. During Apartheid, small-scale fishermen – 
where few except boat owners were white – were ‘considered “illegal” by the state or operated 
under the regulations governing recreational fishers’ (Hauck 2008, p. 638). In the 1990s, the demo-
cratically founded legislation outlined a system of rights and quotas that contained several contro-
versies: for instance, not all individuals that perceived themselves as fishermen necessarily got the 
right to fish or a sufficiently big quota for their livelihood. These aspects have over the years given 
rise to widespread noncompliance to rules and mistrust between actors. Most accentuated is the 
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situation in the abalone fishery (an edible mollusk, harvested through diving). Abalone was heavily 
regulated over the past decades and – because of depleting stocks – its trade was even prohibited 
fully in some years. Yet, due to high demand from Asian markets, the harvesting is extremely lucra-
tive and resources are continuously smuggled abroad – increasing the level of conflict: ‘Animosity 
has escalated to violent proportions where both commercial divers and poachers compete for their 
livelihood. This has led to what is known as the “abalone war” and has also contributed to violence 
between authorities and the poachers’ (Hauck and Sweijd 1999, p. 1029). In-depth studies show 
how criminals from other sectors – such as drug dealers – entered the abalone regime during the 
1990s as profits from harvesting grew (Raemaekers et al. 2011). Abalone poaching is now associat-
ed with violent groups protecting their income in distant coastal localities. The enforcement should 
therefore be seen in this light: substations are located in communities that depend on a livelihood 
threatened by existing regulations. 
A further aspect is the weakness in administrative capacity of DAFF and especially the practice of 
bribery among its low-level officials.7 Following attention from a number of court cases in the 
1990s, corruption has been known to exist in the Compliance Directorate during inspections 
(Raemaekers et al. 2011; Hauck and Gallardo Fernandez 2013). Such behavior may be exhibited by 
receiving boxes of fish or money in exchange for ignoring fishermen’s rule violations. Accounts 
from fishermen depict how they seem to be used to the possibility of paying a bribe when they are 
caught for violations (Sundström 2013). Even more incriminating, it has been shown that some 
officers are directly involved in poaching operations themselves (Sundström 2014a). For instance, a 
police officer was recently convicted of keeping abalone in his freezer with a value exceeding 1.3 
million rands [approximately 125,000 US dollars] (Hermanus Times 2014). Another feature of this 
situation is that a senior manager often controls the substations. These actors have generally stayed 
at one locality along the coast for longer than junior officers and are perceived as being more fused 
in corrupt transactions with fishermen in the local community (Sundström 2014b). 
Methods 
The study’s empirical material consists of interviews with enforcement officers and key informants. 
I performed 43 interviews during the winter and spring of 2014. In detail, 34 respondents were 
inspectors at the Compliance Directorate. Among these were also former inspectors – no longer 
facing potential risks for speaking openly. The other nine persons were key informants, such as 
former senior managers from this directorate, including past directors, and stakeholders such as 
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journalists, scholars and leaders of fishermen associations. They were sampled because of their 
insight into the situation and their views are mainly used to corroborate the accounts given by the 
inspectors. 
I was given permission from the senior ranks of DAFF to conduct the interviews. Management 
contacted the staff with a general message allowing them to speak with me, but they do not know 
which inspectors I later spoke with. The respondents were purposely selected to vary on a range of 
individual features that may affect perceptions and experiences of bribery and violence. I also made 
sure to visit a large number of undisclosed substations along the southern and western parts of the 
coast, known to have different challenges, for instance varying in how heavy local resistance is from 
violent poachers. Respondents were then chosen from these differing locations. Without disclosing 
information about individual respondents that enables their identification it can be said that the 
sample characteristics includes five women, nine white inspectors, and seven substation managers. 
The average years of working experience is 12 years and ranges from under one year to over 39 
years. Two inspectors were recently retired. 
The interviews were most often performed in inspectors’ offices and done in English, the first lan-
guage for a majority of the respondents, so no third party was present during these meetings. The 
talk generally lasted between 30 minutes and one hour. To ensure confidentiality and maintain trust, 
the interviews were performed without a recoding device. Instead I took detailed notes that were 
transcribed the hours after the meeting. The interviews had two parts; a first semi structured sec-
tion where questions focused on the challenge of enforcing the MLRA and the aspects surrounding 
bribe taking when inspecting fishermen. The second part contained open-ended questions where 
respondents were asked to describe how the situation could be improved. They then would often 
initiate detailed descriptions of violent intimidations and how this was perceived to fuel corruption 
– accounts that are analyzed in detail in the next section.  
 
Results 
The following section is organized thematically: first, a number of subsections show the presence 
of violent intimidations that these officials are working under and second, the remaining subsec-
tions illustrate the implications this has for engaging in bribe taking.  
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Bribes are used to make inspectors blind to rule violations 
 
Respondents portray a widespread situation where fishermen and officials are involved in bribery 
that renders violations to go unpunished.8 An inspector describes this behavior:  
We have eleven substations [on one part of the coast]. And out of these I know that only three of them are with-
out corrupt officials … If you should get rid of all corrupt inspectors, then out of our two hundred only thirty 
would be left. (R 13) 
 
In more detail, these bribes often consist of giving a part of the catch to the inspector: 
[An owner of a factory making fish meal that had violated certain rules] said “can we make a plan? I will pay 
you and you will write a better figure.”[i.e. legal level of catches] Then he put something in my pocket, it was a 
thick wad of money. (R 19) 
 
Many fishermen will ask if you want money when they get caught. It is quite common. The person first gives you 
a fish. Then you know they want something in return. (R 20) 
 
Stories of this kind are plentiful from the interviews.9 However, in these accounts it is also obvious 
that not all inspectors are comfortable with this situation. Many claim that they have problems with 
refusing to take these bribes and that they take place in the context of violent intimidations.   
 
Presence of threats when officials enforce rules 
 
It is apparent that the inspectors often feel threatened in their line of work. Numerous accounts 
illustrate such situations: 
Poachers here in [name of area] are like rhino killers. Once, we approached some poachers carrying bags with il-
legal resources. And when we approached them and tried to catch them they started to throw stones. I had to go to 
the hospital [shows injury on the shoulder]. (R 10) 
 
If I’m working in dangerous areas I first have to check my back. You know that they will block the road. They 
will free the person you arrested and take the catch you confiscated … [often] they start throwing stones. (R 28) 
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If you are outnumbered then you are in trouble … The community will help [i.e. help the poachers]. They will 
throw stones, threaten you ... A lot of dangerous encounters. (R 19) 
 
Violence with implications for enforcement 
 
These threats have implications for the work of the inspectors. Accounts describe how they need to 
take these threats into consideration when enforcing regulations: 
[Fishermen without fishing licenses] are dangerous. Because we are in their way. They are prepared to do anything 
… It is always dangerous to approach a new face. You think to yourself ‘Will this poacher be dangerous?’ (R 7) 
 
As a result, sometimes inspectors consider it too risky to enforce as they are supposed to: 
It’s very dangerous to go in there [name of town]. You just have to turn around. You cannot arrest them … Last 
week some person there threatened us with stones. So we just had to let him walk away with poached resources. 
See this scar [shows his chin], a poacher cut me here two years ago. (R 24) 
 
[Fishermen may] threaten that they are going to burn your house. This happened to a colleague, her kids were 
traumatized. There was a case a while back when poachers kidnapped the wife of an inspector. This inspector 
was too enforcing. So there is a balance. (R 6) 
 
And in practice, this ‘balance’ often means that inspectors start to be pragmatic when enforcing 
rules. Being lax to fishermen that violate rules is, in such a situation, the easier choice: 
Once, the community stabbed a colleague when he went to check compliance. He approached some guys who were 
coming up from the water. And he was stabbed. So you cannot go there alone … Your approach is important. 
You cannot be too headstrong. If I see poaching I say to them kindly to throw it in. And I will not write a fine 
… So you show a nice attitude. (R 5) 
 
There is a scaredness. You know that you can trigger violence … They threaten to do this if you are too harsh. It 
hangs over your head. So you start thinking ‘why should I?’ (R 1) 
 
If someone is getting caught they will get aggressive ... So then you have to make a decision, to take their fish or 
think about your life. (R 22) 
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The community will threaten us … So it’s much easier not to go there, to control, but to stay in the office instead. 
(R 29) 
 
It is in such situations that the presence of violence seems to affect the official’s choice to take 
bribes or not: 
Since we work in a dangerous community with abalone poaching it’s a choice between honest work and a relaxed 
lifestyle where you turn a blind eye or become a part of this business. (R 2) 
 
The danger of being the only honest colleague 
 
As stated above, ‘becoming a part of business’ is the name of the corrupt practices between fisher-
men and inspectors. However, refusing to engage in this behavior while being surrounded by in-
volved colleagues has effects on how one is treated on the substation:  
I was driving around together with two colleagues. And then we see these guys coming up from the water. And I 
say to my colleague that we should catch them. But my colleagues just said ‘leave this guy alone’. So now I don’t 
drive together with my colleagues. And they no longer want to smoke or drink with me. (R 9) 
 
It is also perceived that there are professional costs of staying honest that are manifested in signals 
from the senior manager of a substation: 
If the station’s supervisor is corrupt, then why wouldn’t you yourself be? And no one will report. Because then 
they will report on each other. So people are quiet. This is how so many substations work along the coast. (R 13) 
 
[Our management] wants to promote people who always say ‘yes, yes.’ But these persons are not hard on poach-
ing. Many of them even had disciplinary cases against them, for corrupt behavior. But these just disappear. And 
the persons assessing these corrupt guys, of course they get something back. (R 29) 
 
You know how you have to act to become a favorite [of senior managers]: you have to play along. (R 21) 
 
But working side by side with corrupt colleagues has large implications. As described below, this is 
perceived as affecting personal security: 
I ended up working with myself only because of lacking trust to my colleagues. You need to know that if some-
thing happens ‘this guy has my back’. (R 5) 
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Working with such colleagues is dangerous. You’re in the dark at night, arresting people with colleagues you don’t 
trust. You generally know who the corrupt guys are. Their names come around. So you try to avoid these col-
leagues in the future. (R 23) 
 
Inspectors that are colluding with poachers will work as informants, sharing information about 
enforcement operations. This has effects for inspectors that refuse bribery:  
You need someone by your side. If someone pulls a knife you need to have a backup. Because our job is danger-
ous. The other day they even threw stones. The community would know that you are coming. They have some 
ways of knowing about our operations. (R 20) 
 
Three years ago I did a bust and it went bad. They threw a firebomb, burning me. And we exchanged gunfire. So 
they put a price on my head, over 150,000 rand. So I had to move to this station. And the sad thing is that it 
was my own people who had tipped them off, sharing information about this operation. (R 31) 
 
But even more importantly, inspectors that do not take bribes will also be threatened directly by 
other colleagues: 
Being the only inspector at a station that does not accept bribes and that enforces rules hard, it is dangerous. You 
will be a threat to the livelihood of inspector colleagues ... So you might be threatened because of this. (R 26) 
 
Presence of violence shapes an inspector’s choice of residence  
 
The occurrence of violent threats also has ramifications for how inspectors structure their life out-
side the office. One of the most important aspects is the choice of residence. Living in the same 
community as the fishermen has consequences: 
I don’t live in the same community. It is more difficult to enforce rules in your own area. Your life would be in 
danger. Poachers would come to your place at night and threaten you. (R 15) 
 
You don’t want to be a neighbor with anyone you have arrested, like abalone poachers. Then you will be in trou-
ble. (R 17)  
 
When I came here I wanted to stay in the community, but it was not safe. Some fishermen had put fire to the 
place of the previous inspector. You confiscate fish and they will do something like this. So it is the price of not 
playing along. (R 20) 
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Besides the pure issue of security, an inspector that chooses to live within the community of fish-
ermen will also face more frequent temptations and pressure to be lax on violators: 
You cannot live with them. Because you are against them. It would be a problem. I would be forced to be lenient 
[not enforce rules]. I would be threatened otherwise, my family. (R 12) 
 
Colleagues of mine are living in this community. They face problems. They are asked to be ‘blind’ to certain be-
havior. (R 2)  
 
It is not good to work in your area ... Say I would live here in [name], it would be a problem. I would have to 
turn a blind eye. If I know what is best for my life. (R 6) 
 
[Some] inspectors stay by the poachers. When they go out they will meet the poachers. So they live the same life. 
So they cannot be too strong when enforcing. (R 14) 
 
You won’t enforce poaching neighbors too hard. You know that you will become threatened. (R 13) 
 
Temptations and threats: Bribe taking reduces dangers  
 
Besides being dangerous, strict enforcement is also met with social costs for inspectors in their 
neighborhood: 
Like my son’s friends’ fathers, they are fishermen. How can I tell him ‘don’t hang out with them’? Sometimes I 
have to meet them. So there is a line you should draw. If I am in a restaurant they will contact me and speak to 
me. It is very disturbing and it gets to you. Like constantly being asked to receive a box of fish. It’s a dilemma. 
(R 16)  
 
Therefore, taking bribes will solve many of these problems. The following account illustrates that 
bribes result in reduced threats: 
If you take bribes you are protected. You have a role in the community. You got organization protection and po-
lice protection. In the community this is a social thing. They will start helping you. Some inspectors even help the 
poachers drive their vehicles. So its protection, social protection. (R 7) 
 
In light of the fact that ignoring rule violations is easier than enforcing the law, several accounts 
also develop how the choice to take bribes may reduce the threats from fishermen.  
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Our personnel are scared to confront poachers … Instead [of enforcing rules] you start becoming less proud and 
ethical. (R 7) 
 
This process seems to be almost a negotiation of both threats and temptations where it is implicitly 
made clear that taking bribes will make everything much easier for the inspector: 
 [The fishermen] will swear at us. Sometimes even throw stones at us, at our cars. I don’t think shooting at us is 
far away … I will be threatened. Some fishermen will try you. They will say ‘your colleague let me do this’ and 
they say that in these areas inspectors do not care about poachers. The abalone community always tries to bribe 
you. They say ‘lets sit down and perhaps we can sort something out’. Here, if you catch them, they will hate you. 
For the rest of their life. (R 23) 
 
We are taking their food so of course they are aggressive. They will try to give you fish to look away. I live in the 
community of fishermen so it is not safe for me there. They will call me ‘heartless’, my neighbors, that I am taking 
away their bread and butter. (R 26) 
 
The following account shows even clearer how the choice to take bribes reduces the dangers for 
the inspectors:  
Last week I almost got stabbed. I drove in my patrol car and saw how these guys were hiding their illegal catches. 
So I parked my car next to them. Then one broke a bottle, coming towards me and another one had a knife … 
So it is very risky. It is much easier to be blind. Some inspectors are blinder than others. And these officers will 
receive some fish. Not in the harbor, but at their homes, as a gratitude. (R 30) 
 
The officers that start to ignore rule violations are therefore rewarded in the form of bribes. And 
rather than only ignoring rule violations, accounts describe how colluding fishermen and colleagues 
prefer such officials to engage in bribe taking as this reduces the risks that they would choose to 
disclose corrupt practices for outsiders. 
 
Presence of violence renders whistle-blowing dangerous  
 
The presence of violence also works as an efficient means to hinder inspectors telling outsiders of 
the commonly occurring bribery: 
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I would rather shush [puts finger on her lips]. If anyone is on the take here I cannot say anything, then I would 
be on the hit [makes the gun sign to her head]. This happened to me as a traffic officer. Back then I had to find 
the crooks threatening me to be silent and pay them. Not again. (R 9) 
 
Yet, besides the fear of threats, a further issue is that several inspectors are confident that manage-
ment will not take such warnings seriously or could even make these warnings widely known since 
actors in management may also be involved: 
Will the system support you if you expose such behavior? … Confidentiality is required. Then you could blow the 
whistle. Honestly it is not there now. Say you give information to the head office about the actions of your col-
league. The next day everybody at the office will look at you. You can get threats. (R 12) 
 
This, in turn, reduces the willingness to make outsiders aware of the wide use of bribes in the sec-
tor:  
I’m not scared to blow the whistle. That’s why what happened took place [he almost got killed by poachers throw-
ing a firebomb at him after a tip from a colleague]. And although I told everybody in the department about this, 
nothing happened. Everybody knows that nothing happens when you blow the whistle, so then no one will do it. 
(R 31) 
 
Discussion 
This investigation has provided empirical flesh on the intuitive argument put forward in this article, 
that the presence of violence might give rise to direct costs for those civil servants that abstain from 
bribe taking. The accounts also suggest several important aspects of this process. As shown, there 
are dangers associated with refusing to partake in bribery: intimidations come from rule-violating 
citizens and also from colluding colleagues. Further, the material illustrates the social consequences 
of not taking bribes, for instance by shaping inspectors’ choice of residence. In this context, taking 
bribes reduces such costs. Becoming corrupt may therefore be seen as a strategy of social protec-
tion. Moreover, the presence of violent actors and colluding colleagues that will act as informants, 
make whistle-blowing a risky decision.  
A question that begs an answer is why violent actors simply do not defy regulations, without offer-
ing bribes, and why reluctant officials engage in corruption instead of isolating themselves from 
such practices. My response to this question is to suggest that it is a story of an ‘insurance strategy’ 
that resonates quite well with the incentives of the involved actors. From the perspective of law 
violating citizens and colluding bureaucrats, they are more secure if they know that all inspectors 
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are involved in corrupt practices. In such situations, the more bureaucrats that are involved in brib-
ery, an increasing number of officers would have incentives not to blow the whistle themselves. 
Therefore, pressuring reluctant agents to be involved in corrupt practices reduces the number of 
people that may threaten involved parties by telling outsiders of this behavior. Conversely, an indi-
vidual bureaucrat will benefit from engaging in bribery since it reduces the friction with colleagues, 
neighbors and regulatory subjects. Together, this creates an incentive structure where involved 
parties will strive to include bureaucrats in bribery and these will face high costs from refusing to 
do so. 
From a theoretical perspective, it seems that this type of bribery has evolved into an established 
system. Teorell (2007) has in fact suggested that corruption may be understood in terms of an insti-
tution in itself. As pointed out in the literature, while institutions are often seen as solutions to 
problems – for instance by coordinating behavior – they may also be problems themselves when 
there are truly bad ‘rules of the game’. According to Teorell such a perspective may give analytical 
benefits as it ‘highlights another dimension of social conflict produced by and reproducing corrup-
tion … an institutional view of corruption instead stresses horizontal conflicts between different 
sectors of society which may benefit or lose from corruption’ (p. 5). This may in fact be a fitting 
description of what is seen in the empirical investigation. In this setting the arrangements of bribery 
are clearly beneficial for powerful actors, both rule violating citizens and colluding bureaucrats. 
Moreover, it seems that this institutionalized form of corruption is also enforced by an apparatus of 
intimidations and actions, further pointing to how violence may uphold bureaucratic corruption. 
Implications 
There are possible inferences for policy from taking the role of violence seriously. Besides fixing 
the incentives and expectations that exist in the structure of a civil service, this suggests that anti-
corruption reform may benefit from further considering ‘fixing the security’ of bureaucrats working 
in violent contexts. To reduce the costs of being honest, policy should attempt to find strategies to 
guarantee that violent actors may not be able to intimidate bureaucratic agents. For instance, en-
forcement officials working under dangerous conditions are known to be helped by threat assess-
ment that can determine vulnerability and guide interventions (Fein and Vossekuil 2000). Introduc-
ing such schemes may be one practical implication derived from this argument. 
Providing security for bureaucrats in such environments is inherently a challenge when the very 
problem at hand is the lack of administrative ability. Having a bureaucracy infested with corruption 
and difficulties to monopolize the use of violence is usually seen as two results from a low state 
capacity (Bäck and Hadenius 2008). Herein lies also the dilemma of building good government 
  20 
structures as countries with poor institutions tend to be bad in several aspects and these features 
may even reinforce each other. But the insights from this study illustrate the chicken and the egg 
debate: not knowing which came first, makes it difficult to break the cycle. A suggestion following 
from this article could be that if violent threats to honest actors were to decrease, some part of the 
drivers of corruption among bureaucrats would disappear. Therefore, this provides guidance on 
how to blend and pace reforms in such settings and implies that anti-corruption policy should fo-
cus increasingly on the security of civil servants.   
Generalizability 
Since the relationship between violence and bribery remain relatively unexplored, one may merely 
reflect on how the findings travel from the context of this investigation to other settings, both with-
in the country and beyond. Is the dynamics of the fisheries sector more prone to generate violence 
than other sectors in South Africa? Is this story simply about the dynamics of the South African 
state building? While such questions demand thorough investigations in themselves one can find 
anecdotes that suggest that violent resistance toward government regulations occur in other seg-
ments of the South African society as well. One of the more publicly known examples are the “taxi 
wars” that has plagued urban centers for over two decades, in which local drivers violently oppose 
governments attempt to enforce transport policies of communal bus routes (see Dugard 2001). 
Regarding settings outside of South Africa one may argue that the challenge depicted in this inves-
tigation is well comparable to other African states where the administrative capacity of the state is 
limited. In fact, the previously mentioned study by Persson and colleagues (2013) report interviews 
with citizens in Uganda that also touch upon coercive aspects of the relationship between citizens 
and public servants involved in corruption. They also discuss in detail the case of the Kenyan whis-
tleblower John Githongo – a high-ranking public servant under President Mwai Kibaki – that had 
to flee the country after exposing corruption in the Kenyan civil service. This suggests that South 
Africa is not the only state in which there are costs associated with honesty. Yet, looking beyond 
low development states, one may also find such anecdotes among enforcement officers in highly 
developed countries such as the U.S. Consider for instance the situation of the New York City 
Police Department in the 1960s’, made famous through the Hollywood movie Serpico. In reality, 
Frank Serpico – a patrolling policeman that received death threats and became pariah among col-
leagues after testifying of corrupt practices – witnessed in 1971 in front of a public commission of 
the problem of being an honest officer: “the atmosphere does not yet exist in which an honest 
police officer can act without fear of ridicule or reprisal from fellow officers” (cited in New York 
Times 2010). What these anecdotes suggest is that there are possibly plenty of cases – both within 
and outside of South Africa – where the findings of this article may resonate quite well.   
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Conclusions 
This article argues that more aspects than financial incentives and expectations of others’ behavior 
may affect bribe taking among bureaucrats if violence by non-state actors is widespread. Interviews 
with enforcement officials in the South African civil service illustrate this argument and provide 
further suggestive insights into the mechanisms of this process. It is one of the first studies to ex-
amine the consequences of refraining from and engaging in corruption against a violent backdrop. 
The results indicate that intimidations from citizens and corrupt colleagues are an important issue 
for bureaucrats’ decisions to take bribes, or not, because they considerably increase the costs of 
remaining honest. 
This argument pertains specifically to bureaucratic corruption that is collusive, that is, when viola-
tors may pay enforcement agents to be lax in sanctions. The insight that violence may increase the 
presence of bureaucratic corruption of this sort has ramifications for sectors where bribery is 
known to spur noncompliance to regulations – for instance, customs offices (where bribes enables 
smuggling) or city police (thus enabling actions such as drug trade). To tackle these civil servants’ 
propensity to take bribes from rule violators, considering their security – and hence altering the 
costs of remaining honest – may be a worthwhile option for policymakers to explore. Therefore, 
anti-corruption reforms should make further use of insights from research on protection and threat 
assessments of officials. 
To investigate this argument further, future research may benefit from developing this reasoning 
through formal models as well as by nuancing the theoretical expectations of the argument. Re-
search may also gain from investigating this reasoning empirically. For instance, research would 
benefit from exploring the situation of civil servants comparatively in settings with both better and 
worse state. It may also be worthwhile to explore the role of intimidations in relation to explana-
tions focusing on incentives and expectations, for instance through investigating observational data 
of civil servants’ stated reasons for bribe taking, in order to examine the relative merit of this in-
sight.  
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